Dear Chairperson Keiji Furuya,
We are writing in support of your reported plans, as chairperson of the Japan Uyghur Parliamentary Association, to draft a Japanese version of the United States Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).
Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental human rights organization that is dedicated to defending and promoting human rights in more than 100 countries across the world.
Human Rights Watch has documented in detail the Chinese government’s forced labor programs targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims. Our 2024 report found that global car brands, including in Japan, are at risk of exposure to Uyghur forced labor in their aluminum supply chain, adding to a growing body of research that shows that Uyghur forced labor taints industries globally, including solar panels, apparel, seafood, and critical minerals. Human Rights Watch is also a longtime member and co-founder of the Coalition to End Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region and of the Cotton Campaign, both coalitions focusing on addressing State-Imposed Forced Labor (SIFL) in various context and localities.
We are encouraged that you are considering legislation, modeled on the UFLPA, to address the risk that Japanese companies and consumers are exposed to products linked to Uyghur forced labor. Import restrictions preventing the importation of products linked to Uyghur forced labor are a key mechanism for increasing pressure on the Chinese government to end such abusive practices in Xinjiang and beyond.
Human Rights Watch has closely monitored both the legislative processes and implementation of the UFLPA and the European Union’s Forced Labor Regulation (EU FLR), which prohibits the import of products linked to forced labor into the EU. We are writing now to share insights and recommendations from our work on the UFLPA and EU FLR that we believe could assist the Japan Uyghur Parliamentary Association as it develops forced labor import restrictions, please see the annex below.
Thank you for your consideration of our recommendations. We look forward to a constructive relationship with you and would be pleased to discuss these and other matters of mutual concern at any time. We can be reached at.
Yours sincerely,
Kanae Doi
Japan Director
Human Rights Watch
Hélène de Rengervé
Senior Advocate Corporate Accountability
Human Rights Watch
Annex: Human Rights Watch Recommendations
Import restrictions targeting products and product groups from whole regions with high-risk of state-imposed forced labor are a powerful tool for addressing forced labor risks at scale.
Considering the volume of goods concerned by state-imposed forced labor, investigating products individually like the EU FLR is both inefficient for the investigating authorities and miniscule in terms of impact. As whole supply chains are affected, as listed in the law’s introduction, we strongly recommend considering regional bans on specific groups of products. From the UFLPA’s entry into force in December 2021 until August 2025, US Customs and Border Protection stopped goods valued at US3.7 billion because of suspected links to Xinjiang, ultimately denying entry to more than 16,000 shipments. The law has been effective in pushing companies to adopt more responsible sourcing and supply chain practices. Research indicates that there has been a notable shift in investment patterns in the solar industry, primarily in response to the UFLPA. Companies in the solar sector are moving away from sourcing from the Uyghur Region and establishing alternative supply chains that do not rely on inputs from Xinjiang.
Import restrictions should target any region with high risks of state-sponsored forced labor, including but not limited to Xinjiang.
An estimated 3.9 million people are victims of state-imposed forced labor in countries and regions such as Turkmenistan, North Korea, and Xinjiang. Addressing state-imposed forced labor worldwide ensures consumers are protected from buying products made with state-imposed forced labor, whatever its origin.
Legislation targeting state-sponsored forced labor should include a “rebuttable presumption.”
This means that products—or whole groups of products—from regions with a high risk of state-imposed forced labor are automatically treated as having been produced with forced labor and are therefore barred from import. This tool is essential in places like Xinjiang, where independent assessments are impossible due to pervasive surveillance, restricted access, and risks to workers and auditors. A rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of proof to companies operating in or sourcing from these areas, while allowing them to present evidence to challenge a determination and demonstrate that a product was not produced with forced labor.
The definition of forced labor used in the import ban must sufficiently capture state-imposed forced labor.
The well-known International Labour Organization (ILO) 11 indicators of forced labor are important, but they primarily concern situations of forced labor in private supply chains and do not apply to state-imposed forced labor. ILO Convention No. 105 clarifies that states are barred from imposing compulsory work:
- As a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system;
- As a method of mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development;
- As a means of labor discipline;
- As a punishment for having participated in strikes; and
- As a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.
Any definition of state-imposed forced labor in proposed legislation should be in line with the indicators and circumstances described in Chapter 9 of the ILO’s “Hard to see, harder to count: Handbook on forced labor surveys,” as well as with the ILO’s upcoming typology of state-imposed forced labor.
Require companies to map their entire supply chains.
To ensure import bans effectively prevent goods made with forced labor, companies should be required to conduct rigorous desk-based due diligence. While many due diligence steps—such as supply chain mapping, risk assessments, and reviewing purchasing practices—can be conducted remotely, meaningful mitigation and remediation depend on credible, on the ground engagement with workers and local partners. In regions like Xinjiang, however, such engagement is impossible due to systematic restrictions on basic freedoms. Typically, auditors would only be authorized to visit model facilities and sites, under permanent monitoring of state’s watchers and would only be authorized to speak to selected and pre-briefed workers and managers who could only proclaim compliance with all state’s narratives, at risk otherwise of direct retaliation. Import regimes should recognize these limitations and emphasize remote risk analysis rather than relying on infeasible onsite verification.
Guidance to companies on due diligence efforts should clearly outline how to identify potential or actual situations of state-imposed forced labor in their supply chains.
It should explain the limits of social audits in repressive environments where independent worker engagement is impossible, making such audits an unreliable source of information. It should also include guidance on disengagement: companies should fully withdraw from operations, sourcing, or engaging in business relationships in regions with state imposed‑ forced labor to avoid complicity. This approach aligns with the United Nations and recommendations from the Coalition to End Uyghur Forced Labor.
Customs officials should have adequate investigative authority and resources to identify and block products linked to state-imposed forced labor.
Investigative authorities should have the mandate to initiate investigations into products or companies at their own initiative as well as to receive submissions from third parties. Meaningfully implementing import bans also means ensuring agencies have adequate resources and capacity. Governments should also provide support to stakeholders, be they victims, civil society organizations or local communities, to undertake research aimed at documenting and providing evidence of state-imposed forced labor occurrences. Customs officials should be required to disclose publicly the results of investigations and the rationale for decisions to ban products.
Legislation should include measures to address non-cooperation by foreign governments during investigations.
Because state-imposed forced labor is government-led, authorities in those countries often block or obstruct investigations. In the absence of a rebuttable presumption, the EU’s FLR includes a non-cooperation clause (Arts. 17.4 and 20.2) allowing the European Commission to establish that forced labor occurs based on indirect evidence when direct access to information is denied. This covers situations in which companies or public authorities unjustifiably refuse, delay, falsify, or otherwise obstruct the provision of information to hinder an investigation, including through misleading conduct, denial of access, or intimidation, particularly in cases involving suspected state-imposed forced labor.
Legislation should require customs authorities to engage and cooperate with authorities of third countries that have similar legislation in place to increase leverage addressing state-imposed forced labor and avoid re-routing of goods to less protected markets.
The EU FLR requires the European Commission to exchange information with other governments on forced labor risk areas or products (including state-imposed forced labor risks), best practices, and information on decisions to ban products, including their reasons and evidence.
